Volume 15

Issue 3

Article 4

1970

Toward Effective Criminal Discovery: A Proposed Revision of
Federal Rule 16
Alan M. Lieberman

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Alan M. Lieberman, Toward Effective Criminal Discovery: A Proposed Revision of Federal Rule 16, 15 Vill.
L. Rev. 655 (1970).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/4

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Lieberman: Toward Effective Criminal Discovery: A Proposed Revision of Feder
SPRING

1970]

COMMENTS

TOWARD EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL DISCOVERY: A PROPOSED
REVISION OF FEDERAL RULE 16
It is doubtless true that the theory of our adversary system is
attractive in statement. It may be the best we can devise, but it seldom
fits the facts in modern litigation. If it were to operate perfectly, both
parties would have the same opportunities and capacities for investigation, including the resources to finance them, equal good or bad fortune
with reference to availability of witnesses and preservation of eviddence. . . . But there can be no question that the system ought to
enable each litigant in advance to know the exact area of dispute and
to have access to all available data .... 1
I.

INTRODUCTION

The above words of Edmund Morgan urged the adoption of the proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a first step toward realistic
civil litigation. Unfortunately, this piercing analysis of the adversary
system, while heeded in the civil area, has been ignored by the administrators of criminal justice. This is not to say that strides have not been made
toward more effective criminal discovery. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure have been amended to provide the defendant as well as the
Government with a means for obtaining material evidence 2 and New Jer1. E. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OP PROOF 34-35 (1956). For discussion of Mr.
Morgan's approach to discovery, see Louisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and
The Practice of Criminal Law, 14 VAND. L. Riv. 921, 921-24 (1961).

2.

FD.

R.

CRIM.

P. 16.

Discovery and Inspection:
(a) Defendant's Statements; Reports of Examinations and Tests; Defendant's
Grand Jury Testimony. Upon motion of a defendant the court may order the
attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any relevant (1) written or recorded statements or confessions made by
the defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the
government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence
may become known, to the attorney for the government, (2) results or reports of
physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments made in
connection with the particular case, or copies thereof, within the possession,
custody or control of the government, the existence of which is known, or by the
exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the government,
and (3) recorded testimony of the defendant before a grand jury.
(b) Other Books, Papers, Documents, Tangible Objects or Places. Upon
motion of a defendant the court may order the attorney for the government to
permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents,
tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or portions thereof, which are
within the possession, custody or control of the government, upon a showing of
materiality to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable.
Except as provided in subdivisions (a) (2), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by government agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case, or of statements made by government witnesses or prospective
government witnesses (other than the defendant) to agents of the government
except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
(c) Discovery by the Government. If the court grants relief sought by the
defendant under subdivision (a) (2) or subdivision (b) of this rule, it may, upon
motion of the government, condition its order by requiring that the defendant
permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph scientific or medical
reports, books, papers, documents, tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof,
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sey, Vermont and California3 have led the states in developing a more
meaningful system of pretrial criminal discovery. There is still, however,
an apparent reluctance to afford the accused in a criminal trial a means
of discovery equivalent to those means available to any other "litigant"
in our adversary system; the stakes are different, but the principal is the
which the defendant intends to produce at the trial and which are within his
possession, custody or control, upon a showing of materiality to the preparation
of the government's case and that the request is reasonable. Except as to scientific
or medical reports, this subdivision does not authorize the discovery or inspection
of reports, memoranda, or other internal defense documents made by the defendant,
or his attorneys or agents in connection with the investigation or defense of the
case, or of statements made by the defendant, or by government or defense witnesses, or by prospective government or defense witnesses, to the defendant, his
agents or attorneys.
(d) Time, Place and Mannor of Discovery and Inspection. An order of the
court granting relief under this rule shall specify the time, place and manner of
making the discovery and inspection permitted and may prescribe such terms and
conditions as are just.
(e) Protective Orders. Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time
order that the discovery or inspection be denied, restricted or deferred, or make
such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by the government the court may
permit the government to make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of
a written statement to be inspected by the court in camera. If the court enters
an order granting relief following a showing in camera, the entire test of the
government's statements shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to
be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal by the defendant.
(f) Time of Motions. A motion under this rule may be made only within
10 days after arraignment or at such a reasonable later time as the court may
permit. The motions shall include all relief sought under this rule. A subsequent
motion may be made only upon a showing of cause why such motion would be in
the interest of justice.
(g) Continuing Duty to Disclose; Failure to Comply. If, subsequent to
compliance with an order issued pursuant to this rule, and prior to or during trial,
a party discovers additional material previously requested or ordered which is
subject to discovery or inspection under the rule, he shall promptly notify the
other party or his attorney or the court of the existence of the additional materials.
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention
of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule or with an order
issued pursuant to this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance,
or prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
See Rezneck, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 54 Gno. L.J. 1276,
1276-94 (1966). See generally Wright, Proposed Changes in Federal Civil, Criminal,
and Appellate Procedure, 35 F.R.D. 317 (1964).
3. California's reform was accomplished primarily by appellate case law.
See notes 162-73 and accompanying text infra. For a discussion and analysis of
statutes and case law affecting criminal discovery in California, see Hill, Pretrial
Discovery of Prosecution Witnesses in State Courts, in CRIMINAL DiEFNSE TZcHNIQUES § 11.03[3] (R. Cipes ed. 1969) ; Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal
Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 228, 243-50 (1964). But see Murphy, Criminal Discovery: What Progress Since U.S. v. Aaron Burr?, 2 CRIM. L. BULL. 3 (Vol. 2,
No. 5, 1966), for an analysis which indicates California's approach may not be as
progressive as it might be.
New Jersey enacted a criminal practice rule in 1967 in order to improve its
criminal procedure rules. N.J.R. 3:11-1, 3:13-3. See notes 175-81 and accompanying
text infra. See also Hill, supra at § 11.03[4].
Vermont has one of the country's most progressive criminal deposition
statutes. 5 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6721 (Supp. 1969). See notes 182-88 and
accompanying text infra.
For an excellent overview of the tactics employed in criminal discovery, see
AMSTERDAM, SMGAL & MILLtR, TRIAL MANUAL POR THE DtFrNSt or CRIMINAL CASES
§§ 265-76 (1967) ; Hill, supra; Rezneck, PretrialDiscovery in the Federal Courts, in
CRIMINAL DaFxNSs TECHNIQUZS (R. Cipes ed. 1969).
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same: in order for the adversary system to function properly, evidence
must be accessible in advance so that the parties can prepare accordingly
4
to meet their opponent's case.
It is posited that our present criminal discovery provisions are inadequate and must be reformed to afford the criminal defendant liberal discovery opportunity in order to ensure a fair and just disposition of the
case. The purpose of this Comment is fourfold: (1) to briefly discuss
the evolution of pretrial criminal discovery, and the traditional arguments
for and against liberalization; (2) to examine certain categories of evidence which a criminal defendant would want to discover and the provisions that the present system affords for discovery of this evidence; (3) to
analyze recent proposals made to modernize criminal discovery; and (4)
to propose further legislation geared to removing any remaining vestiges
of the "sporting contest"5 from criminal litigation.

If.

THE PRESENT STATE OF CRIMINAL DISCOVERY

There are two separate problems which must be examined if discovery reform is to be achieved - the type of evidence6 which is or should
be discoverable and the procedural limitations on the discovery of such
evidence.
A.
1.

Types of Evidence

What Is Discoverable

Federal Criminal Procedure Rule 16 is the principal discovery device
in the federal courts. The new Rule 16, which became effective in July,
1966, reflects a trend toward liberalizing criminal discovery. 7 Under Rule
4. See Traynor, supra note 3, at 228.
5. See Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution:Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?,
1963 WASH. L.Q. 279.
6. "Evidence" is used throughout this Comment in its broadest sense and not
restricted to items admissible at trial.
7. Prior to enactment of the new Rule 16 in 1966, the district judge, upon demand
by the defendant, was authorized to permit inspection of "books, papers, documents,
or tangible objects obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained from
others by seizure or process." The rule further required that items be properly designated, material to the defendant's preparation for trial and the request be reasonable.
Under the old Rule, the names and addresses of witnesses were usually not discoverable. See, e.g., United States v. Haug, 21 F.R.D. 22 (E.D. Ohio 1957). For a discussion of the operation of old Rule 16 and cases under it, see Discovery in Federal
Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 106-07 (1963). Moreover, the defendant's own statements, vital evidence both to the defendant and the prosecutor in that they are
admissible at trial to the extent that they contain admissions, were held to be undiscoverable under the old Rule 16. See Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D.
47, 107 (1963).
The denial of discovery of these items was based, apparently, on the theory
that Rule 16 only operated when the defendant had a property interest in his own
statement. See, e.g., United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812, 820 (2d Cir. 1962), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 828 (1962). Although the Rule on its face afforded wide discretion
to the trial judge in granting discovery of diverse types of evidence, it was generally
strictly construed. See Traynor, supra note 3, at 229. It would seem, therefore, to be
ineffective as a discovery device for the defendant.
Following the 1966 changes in the federal rules, some states re-evaluated
their policies on criminal discovery. The commission revising New York's criminal
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16(a) the accused is given access to (1) his own written or recorded
statements or confessions in the possession of the government, (2) results
of scientific reports and (3) the defendant's own recorded testimony
before the grand jury. With respect to these categories of evidence, no
burden is placed on the accused to designate items with particularity, to
show their materiality to his case, or the reasonableness of his request.8
Although courts generally grant defendant's discovery requests, it is still
very much within the trial court's discretion.6
Rule 16(b) permits discovery of other "books, papers, documents,
tangible objects . . . or portions thereof" which the Government has in

its possession. Two burdens are placed on the defendant which he must
meet before the court will grant his motion for discovery under 16(b) :
(1) the information or item must be material to the preparation of his
defense and (2) his request must be reasonable. There is no language in
subsection (b) that would require the standard of materiality to be any
more stringent than that applied to the civil rules of discovery under Rule
26(b).1 ° Under the civil rules, items must be "relevant to the subject
matter" but they need not be admissible in evidence if the defendant can
show that the items he seeks to discover may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. While the "materiality" requirement may be applied
very liberally permitting broad discovery, it may also be applied stringently,
placing a heavy burden on the defendant. There is no provision in Rule
16 for interrogatories to the Government or depositions by defense counsel
for discovery purposes, and the Rule as applied could make the laying of
a foundation to support a Rule 16(b) discovery motion impossible. 1 As
to tangible objects, it could be extremely difficult to demonstrate the materiality of an item which has never been seen by the defense or which the
defense has no knowledge of its existence. 12 "Reasonableness" is also left
undefined by the Rule, and therefore remains a vague standard. However, it would seem that any request for an item which is material to the
defendant's case will be deemed reasonable by the court' 3
procedure recommended adoption of the federal approach. See Proposed N.Y. CuMs.
PROC. LAW art. 125 (Sept. 1967), cited in ABA STANDARDS, DISCOVERY AND PROCADUR4
B~riOR TRIAL 35 (Tent. Draft, 1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
For brief sketches of current state law of discovery, see Hill, supra note 3,
at § 11.01[5] ; Louisell, supra note 1, at 938-45; Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 HAST.
L.J. 865, 867-69 (1968).
For purposes of comparison, see CONN. G N. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-86, 54-86a
(1969); DxL. R. CRIm. P. 16; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.220; MD. R. CRIM. P. 727, 728;
MONT. RIV. CoDE §§ 95-1802 to 95-1804; N.J.R. 3:13-11, 3:13-3; PA. R. CRIm. P.
310, 311.
8. See Rezneck, supra note 2, at 1277. FtD. R. CRIM. P. 16(b), retains these
requirements as to items discoverable under the Rule.
9. However, the argument has been made that the rule grants a presumptive
right of discovery to the defendant in light of the requirement in FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(e) (protective orders), that discovery be refused if the prosecution shows a
potential for abuse. See Moore, supra note 7, at 871.
10. See Rezneck, supra note 2, at 1279. See also Developments in the Law Discovery, 74 HARV. L. Rtv. 940, 1007-08 (1961).
11. See Rezneck, supra note 2, at 1279.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1280.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/4
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Subsection (b) of Rule 16 specifically exempts from discovery two
categories of evidence: (1) "reports, memoranda, or other internal documents made by government agents in connection with the investigation or
prosecution of the case," and (2) "statements made by government witnesses or prospective government witnesses (other than the defendant)
to agents of the Government except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500." 14
The former is a "work product"'15 exemption; the latter, in effect, makes
the Jencks Act the sole implement for discovery of witness' statements. 16
It should be noted that the Rule 16 "work product" exemption is absolute while its counterpart in the civil rules can be circumvented; a showing of good cause may overcome the civil privilege for certain "work
product" documents which would be completely exempted under the crim17
inal rule.
Two important categories of evidence appear to be discoverable under
subsection (b) : (1) statements of co-defendants and (2) criminal records
of government witnesses.' 8 Logically, subsection (b) should be read to
cover items not otherwise covered by subsection (a) and not protected
from discovery by specific exemption ;19 therefore, it would seem discovery
of these two items is apparently authorized by Rule 16(b).
At least one commentator believes that Rule 16(b) can be read to
authorize pretrial discovery of statements of witnesses the Government
does not intend to call at trial. 20 The incorporation of the Jencks Act into
subsection (b) could be interpreted that it shall serve as the sole method
for discovery of witness' statements. 21 The exemption in subsection (b),
however, is limited to "government witnesses or prospective government
witnesses," thereby leaving open the question of whether or not the statements of witnesses the Government does not intend to call should be discoverable. Such statements are never obtainable under the Jencks Act
and if Rule 16(b) is read to exclude them from discovery, the defendant
could be denied extremely important information.
Certainly subsection (b) should not be read to exclude evidence which
could be constitutionally compelled as a matter of due process under
14. The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964), provides in part:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement
or report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government
witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) to an
agent or the Government shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection
until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
15. See note 195 and accompanying text infra.
16. See note 208 infra. One commentator has suggested that FD. R. CRIM. P.
17.1, which provides for a pretrial conference, might lead to discovery of Jencks Act
statements in the interest of a fair trial and if justice demanded. See Rezneck, supra
note 2, at 1282.
17. See Rezneck, supra note 2, at 1281 & n.16.
18. Id. at 1284-87. Regarding co-defendant's statements and the constitutionality
of their use against defendant, see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
19. Id. at 1284.
20. Id. at 1286.
21. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 350 (1959), in which the Court
held that the Jencks Act provided the exclusive means for discovery of statements
made
by Government
Rezneck,
3, Repository,
at § 10.02[5]
Published
by Villanova
Universitywitnesses.
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Brady v. Maryland.22 The requirement in Brady that the Government
make available material favorable to the defense greatly expands the evidence discoverable by the defense. 28 The Supreme Court, while never
clearly defining the type of evidence which must be disclosed, indicated
that disclosure of information in the possession of the Government which
is "favorable" to the defendant is compelled by the due process clause of
the Constitution.2 4 The Court was not concerned with the motives of the
prosecutor but rather focused on "fairness" to the defendant - who, in
most instances, is at a great disadvantage in terms of investigatory capability. However, if "favorable" evidence is interpreted as encompassing only
exculpatory evidence, 25 then the defendant will lose discovery of evidence
tending to prove his guilt but helpful in preparation of his case. 26 It is
also difficult to determine whether a particular piece of evidence is exculpatory in many instances and unless revealed to defense counsel it is impossible for him to show whether the evidence is exculpatory. 27 If the
primary concern of the Court was "fairness" to the defendant, then the
proper standard should be whether the information in any way aids the
defendant in preparation of his case. While the decision leaves many
difficult questions unanswered, 28 it does serve to some extent as a valuable
supplement to Rule 16.
2.

What Should Be Discoverable

Although there are many items of evidence which should be discoverable, an examination of the major areas - witness lists and statements;
grand jury minutes and untranscribed testimony; and electronic surveillance, informants and illegal police activity 29 - will serve as an illustration
of the obstacles to effective discovery and trial preparation.
22. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

23. Id. Petitioner, convicted of first degree murder, asked for leniency based on a
confession made by his co-defendant admitting the actual killing. The state had

possession of all of the co-defendant's statements, and when asked by defense counsel
to hand over the statements it complied, excepting the crucial statement. The Supreme
Court affirmed the Maryland court of appeal's decision to grant a new trial on the
issue of sentencing.
24. The Court stated that:
[t]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.
Id. at 87. See Rezneck, supra note 3, at §10.05[1]-10.05[3] ; Comment, The Prosecutor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALP L.J. 136
(1964).
25. The Court in Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 214, 216 (1942), remanded stating
that ". . . the evidence there presented is inconsistent with the evidence presented ....
and clearly exonerates petitioner" (emphasis added). The Court characterized the
exonerating evidence as "favorable." At least one court talks in terms of "material"
evidence. United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 123 F. Supp. 759, 762 (W.D. Pa.
1954). The language and rationale of the courts have been vague but relief has been
granted only when the suppressed evidence was in some way exculpatory. See
Comment, supra note 24, at 147 and n.50.
26. Cf. State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958).
27. See Comment, supra note 24, at 147.
28. Id. at 149-50.
29. A more complete list would include such items as co-defendant's statements,
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Witness Lists and Statements

Witness lists and statements, probably the most valuable evidence to
defense counsel, are not readily available to him as a result of the incorporation of the Jencks Act into Rule 16(b). Several states have provisions for discovery of this material. 80 However, there are several procedural obstacles to witness discovery in the jurisdictions which do permit
it, e.g. the trial judge's discretionary power, which militates against the
effectiveness of the disclosure.3 1
One recent commentator 2 suggests two factors which require that
discovery of the names of witnesses3 3 be left to the discretion of the trial
judge: (1) the danger of witness tampering3 4 and (2) the possibility of
hampering the prosecution of large criminal organizations as a result of
premature disclosure of informers.3 5 Substantially the same arguments
are made for a similar stance on the statements of witnesses. 6 It is further argued that the need for discovery is reduced because defense counsel
could interview or take depositions of witnesses. 87 This argument is not
viable because in the interview situation the prosecutor may advise his
see ABA

STANDARDS, supra note 7, at § 2.1(a) (ii)
Rezneck, supra note 3, at
§ 10.02[5] [c]; and prior criminal records of witnesses, see ABA STANDARDS, Supra

note 7, at § 2.1 (a) (vi) ; Rezneck, supra note 3, at § 10.02(5) (d).
For similar treatment of categories of evidence, see ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 7, at 56-77; Moore, supra note 7, at 882-88; Developments in the Law, supra
note 10, at 1043-61.
30. See note 7 supra for examples of state statutes. See also State v. Mahoney,
122 Vt. 456, 461, 176 A.2d 747, 750 (1961).
31. Most state courts permit inspection by defense counsel of witness' statements
only for the purpose of preparing for cross-examination and impeachment rather than
for the purpose of general pretrial preparation of an affirmative defense. The general
rule is that such statements are made available to the defense only after the witness
has testified on direct examination at the trial. In the more liberal jurisdictions, two
basic requirements must be met: (1) the requested statement must be relevant and (2)
the statement must be neither confidential nor otherwise privileged. Somewhat more
conservative jurisdictions, on the other hand, usually permit such inspection only
after defendant shows: (1) in what way, specifically, the statement will aid the
defendant in cross-examination of that witness or (2) that an inconsistency exists
between the witness' statement and the witness' testimony at trial.
Regardless of the jurisdiction in which the defendant comes to trial, in order
that he discover witness' statements he must lay a proper foundation for inspection.
At the very least he may be asked to show the statement's relevancy to his defense,
and he may even be asked to show specifically in what manner the statement will
impeach the witness or be otherwise useful in cross-examination. It appears necessary
that the defendant have the statement before him in order to adequately hurdle the
preliminary obstacles to discovery. Even if he manages to lay a proper foundation, the
granting of the motion is "within the trial court's discretion." See Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d
181-217 (1966).
32. Moore, supra note 7, at 887.
33. Federal law requires a witness list to be provided at least three days before
trial for capital offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 3432 (1958). See Hill, supra note 3, at § 11.02;
Orfield, List of Witnesses and Jurors in Federal Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 527 (1968).
34. See p. 669 infra.
35. But see McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967), in which the Court held
that there is no constitutional duty to reveal the identity of an informer when the issue
is the validity of the arrest without a warrant. For California's approach, see Hill,
supra note 3, § 11.02[2] [B].
36. See p. 686 infra.
37. See notes 39 and 182 infra.
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witnesses not to discuss the case with any other persons, 88 and because
Rule 15,89 which provides for depositions, is so limited in its application
that it is of little aid to the defendant as a discovery device.
The American Bar Association Advisory Committee, in an excellent
comprehensive study of pretrial discovery standards, 40 urged a different
approach to the problem of witness lists and statements. The committee
proposal directs the prosecutor to disclose to the defense counsel "the
names and addresses of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends
to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial, together with their relevant
written or recorded statements ....
-41 The committee argues that discovery of names and statements facilitates plea discussions and "goes to
the heart of the general proposition that defense counsel must be permitted to prepare adequately to cross-examine the witnesses against the
accused and otherwise test their credibility as well as to produce other
evidence relevant to the facts in issue. '' 42 The committee is persuaded by
four basic principals - the fundamental concept of fairness requires early
disclosure, prior disclosures alleviate delays at trial, early disclosure is
necessary for adequate preparation and for minimizing surprise, and pro43
tective orders are available if a denial of discovery is required.
b.

Grand Jury Minutes and Untranscribed Testimony

The present rule limits discovery to defendant's statements before
the grand jury. 44 The grand jury hearing can be a very valuable tool of
the prosecution 45 because neither the defendant nor his counsel are permitted to be present at the hearing and the prosecutor has free rein to
develop testimony of any witness he chooses to call. The testimony,
therefore, tends to be one-sided and underdeveloped from a defense standpoint because defense counsel has not had the opportunity to crossexamine the witnesses called before the grand jury by the prosecutor.
This shortcoming aside, the transcript would provide the defendant with
statements of certain key witnesses and greatly aid him in explaining
specific incriminating evidence and in refuting any perjured government
testimony. 46 However, the grand jury proceedings have traditionally been
38. In some jurisdictions it is possible to get an order to enjoin the prosecution
from interfering with defense counsel's right to seek witness interviews. See Lewis v.
Lebanon County, - Pa. -,
A.2d __ (1969) ; People v. Cooper, 53 Cal. 2d 755,
770-71, 349 P.2d 964, 973-74, 3 Cal. Rptr. 148, 157-58 (1960) ; Traynor, supra note 3,
at 244-45.
39. FZD. R. CRIM. P. 15, permits the taking of depositions where the witness will
be otherwise unavailable for trial. Its purpose is the preservation of testimony, rather
than for the general purpose of discovery. For similar state rule, see MD. R. CRIM.
P. 727.
40. ABA STANDARDS, note 7 4upra.
41. Id. at g 2.1(a)(i).
42. Id. at 56.
43. Id. at 57-58.
44. F"i. R. CRiM. P. 16(a), states in pertinent part that, "the court may order
the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect ... (3) recorded
testimony of the defendant before a grand jury."
45. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 10, at 1056-57.

46. Id. at 1057.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/4
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shrouded in secrecy.' 7 Here again the American Bar Association Advisory
Committee takes a substantially liberal view in advocating discovery of
grand jury testimony of the accused and "relevant testimony of persons
whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at the hearing
or trial."' 48 The committee cites Dennis v. United States,49 where the
Court relaxed the standard for defense showing a "particularized need"
and recognized that disclosure is in the best interest of proper administration of criminal justice,50 as indicative of a liberalizing trend in the
courts. In a more recent decision"1 a court also held that a defendant
need not show a "particularized need" for the trial judge to allow disclosure under Rule 16.52
c.

Electronic Surveillance, Informants, And Illegal Police Activity

Suppression of illegally seized evidence under the exclusionary rule 5
at the pretrial stage is an important aspect of effective criminal defense.
While the Court in Alderman v. United States54 required disclosure to
the defense of records of illegal electronic eavesdropping, there was no
indication as to when disclosure was to take place. The importance of
early disclosure of illegal eavesdropping is apparent if the defense attorney is to put forth an effective argument for suppression.5" Disposition
of this collateral issue, possibly at a pretrial hearing, could avoid delay
at trial and circumvent any prejudice that might result from a jury being
aware of defense counsel's efforts to "keep evidence from them."
Knowledge of the existence of informants is equally important to the
defendant5" and poses problems of policy similar to those presented by
discovery of illegal electronic surveillance. Early disclosure can hinder
the prosecution of other crimes or otherwise compromise the Government
concerning matters of organized crime or national security. These difficult policy considerations prompted the Advisory Committee to require
the prosecutor initially to disclose only the possibility of an issue of illegal
57
informants or electronic surveillance existing in the particular case.
47. Id. at 1056. For criticism of grand jury secrecy, see Calkins, Grand Jury
Secrecy, 63 MicH. L. Rv. 455 (1965) ; Seltzer, Pre-TrialDiscovery of Grand Jury
Testimony in Criminal Cases, 66 Dici. L. Rnv. 379 (1962); Sherry, Grand Jury
Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. Riv. 668 (1962).

48. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7,at § 2.1 (a)(iii).
49. 384 U.S. 855, 872 (1966). F4D. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), authorizes disclosure of
grand jury minutes "preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding."
Usually a "particularized need" must be shown before disclosure of the minutes to
defendant. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959).
50. Id. at 870.

51. United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
52. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 64.
53. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See note 107 infra.
54. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
55. See ABA STANDARDS, ELE4CTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 2.3 (Tent. Draft, 1968).
56. See note 35 supra.

57. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at § 2.1(b) (i) and (iii), and commentary
at 71-72. One alternative provided the government to protect informants is to move
the court for permission to perpetuate a witness' testimony for use at trial if he is
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ProceduralDeficiency of Rule 16

Discretion

The greatest source of confusion and ineffectiveness in criminal discovery from a defense standpoint is the trial court's application of its
discretion 58 in granting discovery. With no real guidelines for defining
the boundaries of its discretion,"9 the court will often base its decision
on a variety of factors, some of which will be considered below. A few
of these factors deserve weight, others do not. The real question, at this
stage, is whether the trial court's discretion has any place in the initial
determination of all requests for discovery or whether it should be called
into play only as a protective measure after the prosecution has clearly
demonstrated that the order must be denied to prevent abuse by defendant.6 0
Rule 16(a) reads: "[u] pon motion of a defendant the court may order
the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and
copy or photograph any relevant" statements made by the defendant and
results of scientific tests. Rule 16(b) contains the same language in regard
to other items of evidence. Consequently, it is apparent that whether a

defendant discovers certain evidence depends on the particular court's
interpretation of its discretionary power. This interpretation can range
from a presumption in favor of discovery to one that disfavors discovery. 61
should minimize the use of improper methods intended to force the witness to change
his testimony or not show up at trial. See CoMmTrmZ

ON RuLes or PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURZ OF THP JUDICIAL CONFERENCE Or THn UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AM4NDM/NTS TO TH4 FEDERAL RuLEs or CRIMINAL PROCEDUR 37, 53 (1970) [hereinafter

cited as JUDICIAL CONFERENCE].
58. See Moore, supra note 7, at 868; United States v. Kaminsky, 275 F. Supp.
365 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (court denied discovery to defendant because he did not demonstrate that his request for discovery was warranted) ; United States v. Diliberto, 264
F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (court held that actual need must exist before discovery would be granted) ; United States v. Louis Carreau, Inc., 42 F.R.D. 408
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (court held that absent a showing of good cause the Government
could not be required to make pretrial disclosure of defendant's prior statements).
Most states make witness discovery and other criminal discovery dependent
on the discretion of the trial court. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, and Kentucky
adopted discovery rules nearly identical with the old Rule 16. It is possible for the
court in these jurisdictions to be within the bounds of its discretion while denying
defendant access to confessions, scientific reports and tests, and statements of prosecution witnesses. See Hill, supra note 3, at § 11.01[5] & n.52; Annot., supra, note 31,
at 208-11.
However, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, and Tennessee provide
rules making mandatory pretrial disclosure to an accused of his confession or statements. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.220; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 114-10i MICH. GiN. CT. R.
785; N.J.R. § 3:13-3(2); T4NN. CODE ANN. § 40-1708. Florida and New Jersey
extend this mandatory class to include scientific or medical reports and recorded
testimony by defendant before the grand jury. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.220(a) (2), (3)
N.J.R. § 3:13-3(a) (iii), (iv) ; Hill, supra note 3, § 11.01 (5), at 11-16.
59. See Moore, supra note 7, at 868.
60. This approach is most nearly approximated by California. Compare People v.
Estrada, 54 Cal. 2d 713, 355 P.2d 641, 7 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1960) ; Cash v. Superior
Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959) ; Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423,
340 P.2d 593 (1959), with People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr.
424 (1963).
61. See Hill, supra note 3, § 11.01 (5), at 11-16.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/4
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While framing discovery in broad terms as a matter of right could foster
abuse, framing it in terms of discretion can rob any discovery rule of
62
real effectiveness.
Two variables - the type of evidence and its usefulness to the defendant - have led one commentator to suggest that defendants be given
the right to discover certain specified evidence, while other items should
be left to the court's discretion.6 3 To give this approach any force, discretion should be interpreted to mean that the defendant has a presumptive
right to discover certain evidence, and that refusal to allow discovery
should be based on a "reasonable likelihood of abuse of the privilege by
defendant or his counsel." 6 4 However, this suggestion still leaves the
defendant at the mercy of the court's discretion - a subjective standard,
easily abused.
Looked at realistically, instead of as a neat legal concept, 'discretion
of the trial judge' in the area of criminal discovery appears more
clearly for what it often is: an escape hatch from the rigors of formulating a reasonable rule for a complex situation. Actually, discretion
of the trial judge has been pretty much the rule in criminal discovery
for many years with the5 result that in most jurisdictions there has
been no such discovery.
This is not to say that protective measures are not necessary and
both Rule 16 and the Advisory Committee's proposals provide for protective orders. 66 The committee's approach, however, allows for more
effective discovery. Its proposals mandate discovery of certain evidence;
it is with regard to mandated matter that the committee envisions the use
of the protective order.6 7 Rule 16, in contrast, contains "discretionary
language" 68 within the sections which authorize disclosure of a particular
item in addition to Rule 16(e) which authorizes the protective order.
The effect is that under Rule 16 the court's discretion is automatically
invoked when the accused moves for disclosure, while under the committee's proposals it does not come into play until the prosecution has actually
shown circumstances for denial of the discovery motion.
2.

Relevancy and Materiality

A "relevance" limitation found in Rule 16(a) and in the Advisory
Committee's proposed standards creates another area of difficulty. The
62. See Moore, supra note 7, at 881.

63. Id. at 881-82.
64. New Jersey and California have apparently implemented this interpretation
of discretion. See Report of N.J. Supreme Court's Special Committee on Discovery
in Criminal Cases, 90 N.J.L.J. INDx 209 (1967). For development of California
appellate case law, see Murphy, supra note 3.
65. Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIP. L.
Rev. 56, 98 (1961).
66. FtD. R. CRIM. P. 16(e) ; ABA, STANDARDS, supra note 7, at § 4.4.
67. ABA STrANDARDS, supra note 7, at 101.
68. The language in F4D. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) (b) is "... the court may order."
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purpose of this limitation, as stated by the committee, is to prevent harassment of one party by another or interference with government investigation in unrelated cases.6 9 Most reasonable men would agree that the
defense counsel is the most qualified person to decide what is relevant to
his client's defense. 70 Under our present system of criminal discovery,
however, the prosecutor in deciding what prior statements should be
offered to the defendant, 71 and the trial court in deciding whether to allow
the prosecution to exclude part of a statement from discovery, are called
72
upon to make the "relevance" determination for the defense counsel.
The committee, aware of the possibility of abuse, implores prosecutors
and trial courts not to be "stingy" in their interpretation of "relevance. '73
The success of the committee's proposed rules depends on a liberal interpretation ;74 and the plea to prosecutors and judges to so interpret the term
isolates the problem, but does not solve it. A "stingy" interpretation can
still be well within the proposed standard and limitation of effective discovery is the end result. It is this opportunity for emasculation which
must be eliminated from criminal pretrial discovery procedure.
3.

The "At Trial" Standard

The Advisory Committee in its proposed standards requires the prosecutor to disclose only items, names, and statements which he intends for
use at trial. The committee recognizes several problems in the application
of this criterion of the "expected production at trial" as a requirement
for pretrial disclosure. 75 The many variables that affect the prosecution
of a criminal case will severely limit the prosecutor's ability to accurately
predict what evidence he will produce at trial. 70 The resultant delay in
the flow of information to the defendant deprives him of necessary evidence and sufficient time for effective utilization when he finally does
receive it. 77 This criterion is a severe impediment when the prosecutor
is deluged with a large volume of routine cases and will not, as a practical matter, begin serious preparation until shortly before trial.7 8 But
69. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 54.
70. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957); ABA

note 7, at 55.

71.
72.
73.
74.

STANDARDS,

supra

See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 55.
Id.
Id.
The Advisory Committee in commenting on the proposed amendments to the

civil rules' requirement of relevance stated:
[s]ince decisions as to relevance to the subject matter of the action are made for
discovery purposes well in advance of trial, a flexible treatment of relevance is
required and the making of discovery, whether voluntary or under court order,
is not a concession or determination of relevance for purposes of trial.
CoMMITTEz ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE olt THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULES, 43 F.R.D. 211, 229

(1967).
75.
76.
77.
78.

See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 55.
Id.
It is possible for this delay to last until the trial itself. Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/4

12

Lieberman: Toward Effective Criminal Discovery: A Proposed Revision of Feder

1970]

SPRING

COMMENTS

the committee argues that pretrial disclosure based on this "at trial" standard will increase the predictability of the trial, 79 and impliedly, facilitate
its disposition. In addition, the committee submits that the "at trial" criterion achieves one of the primary goals of pretrial discovery - to inform
the defendant of the evidence he will be confronted with at the trial so
that he can effectively dispute its validity.80 The committee has urged a
sound policy, but it falls short of adequately meeting the defendant's
discovery needs. Beyond merely refuting evidence against him the defendant would do well to prepare a positive defense. To adequately do
so he must have access to all available evidence regardless of its use at
the trial itself. What the prosecutor cannot use, possibly the defendant
can. This information might seem insignificant to the prosecutor and be
lost in his files leaving the defendant without a crucial lead or necessary
8
link in preparing his case. 1
III.

THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST LIBERAL DISCOVERY

The lament of the prosecutor was perhaps most typically expressed
by Judge Learned Hand:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every advantage.
While the prosecution is held rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his defense. He is immune from question
or comment on his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the
least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition he should in advance have the whole evidence against him to
pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully . . .
Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our
procedure has been always haunted82by the ghost of the innocent man
convicted. It is an unreal dream.
Traditionally there are several arguments which are raised by prosecutor's8 8 as justification for limiting pretrial discovery by the accused: (1)

full knowledge of the facts will afford the defendant the opportunity to
79. Id. at 55.
80. Id. at 56.
81. It is, perhaps, significant to note that no "at trial" limitation exists in civil
discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b), provides in pertinent part that "it is no ground for
objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
The notes of the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules make it clear that
discovery is to be broad and should cover not only evidence for use at trial but also
evidence inadmissible at trial that will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
A broad search must be permitted for any matters which may aid a party in preparing
his case. "[A]dmissibility at trial should not be the test as to whether the information
sought is within the scope of proper examination. Such a standard unnecessarily
curtails the utility of discovery practice." ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL
PROCEDURt,

REPORT Ol PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES Or CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE

DISTRICT COURTS Ol THE UNITED STATES

34 (1946).

82. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
83. Compare Flannery, Prosecutor's Position: Arguments and Illustrations
Against Liberalization of Defense Discovery Rules; Need for Prosecutor's Discovery
of Specific Defenses, 33 F.R.D. 74 (1963), with Pye, The Defendant's Case for More
Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 82 (1963).
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manufacture evidence and invite perjury,8 4 (2) knowledge of witnesses'
names will afford defendant the opportunity to bribe, intimidate, or suborn
to perjury these witnesses,8 5 (3) there is no reciprocity and defendant
may deny discovery to the prosecution by asserting his constitutional right
against self-incrimination, 6 (4) there are neither the funds nor the manpower available to effectuate an effective discovery program, and (5) the
existing informal discovery procedures are sufficient. These arguments
have been made many times over and they are basically self-explanatory.
However, some discussion will shed light on the validity of these claims.
A.

The Character of the Defendant: A Bar to Discovery

The character of the defendant is often utilized as a justification for
denying him full and open discovery.87 It is argued that whereas the
parties in a civil trial are usually law abiding citizens peacefully seeking
a resolution to disputes involving money or property,8 8 defendants in a
criminal proceeding are often desperate enough to have witnesses threatened or removed and are capable of doing so.8 9 The criminal defendant
generally has much more to lose than the civil litigant - his liberty and
sometimes his life. 90 Given the vicious nature of many crimes, prosecutors argue, an added transgression against society is not unreasonable,
especially if it will result in an acquittal. Implicit in this line of reasoning
is the assumption that all accused are guilty, that to avoid inevitable conviction they will take any measures necessary and that existing laws and
sanctions against perjury and bribery are ineffective as deterrents to such
activity. 91 The argument further implies that by denying the criminal
defendant early discovery this unlawful activity will be abrogated.
84. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210-11, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953). See Commonwealth v. Caplan, 411 Pa. 563, 192 A.2d 894 (1963). Since Tune, New Jersey courts
have departed from this line of reasoning. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133,
145 A.2d 313 (1958).
85. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210-11, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953). A major concern of prosecutors and police investigators is that persons who know their names will
be made available to the defendant will refuse to cooperate for fear of retribution.
See Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481, 485 (1968) (remarks of Stephen
E. Kaufman).
86. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 211, 98 A.2d 881, 884-85 (1953). See generally
Wilder, Prosecution Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 6 Am.
CRIM. L.Q. 3 (1967) ; Comment, The Self-Incrimination Privilege: Barrier to
Criminal Discovery, 51 CALIF. L. Riv. 135 (1963).
87. See Flannery, supranote 83, at 78.
88. Id.
89. See Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481, 485 (1968) (remarks of Mr.
Stephen E. Kaufman).
90. This same argument is used as a justification in favor of extending defendant's
rights of discovery. See generally Brennan, supra note 5; Everett, Discovery in
Criminal Cases - in Search of a Standard, 1964 DUKg L.J. 477; Fletcher, Pretrial
Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. lRv. 293 (1960) ; Goldstein, The
State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J.
1149 (1960) ; Krantz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: A Necessity for Fair
and Impartial Justice, 42 N41. L. R~v. 127 (1963) ; Louisell, supra note 65; Traynor,
supra note 3.

91. Goldstein, supra note 90, at 1193.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/4
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There is no real attempt by commentators favoring liberal discovery
to deny the possibility of perjury and witness-tampering occurring in
criminal cases; but this same abuse is a possibility in civil litigation, especially in cases involving actions for misrepresentation or other related
torts which call a civil defendant's integrity directly into question. The
two relevant questions, therefore, which must be considered are whether
there is a substantial relationship between early discovery and perjury or
witness-tampering9 2 and whether the possibility of perjury or witness
intimidation justifies denial of effective discovery to all defendants. Even
if there is a relationship between early discovery and perjury or witnesstampering in the civil area 93 the result has not been a restricting but a
broadening of discovery.
It could validly be argued that in criminal discovery there exists a
substantial relationship between these elements. But practically speaking,
most criminal defendants are indigent 94 and represented by court appointed
counsel.9 5 In short they are not in a financial position to bribe witnesses,
and, because they are often unable to post bond, 96 would not have an
opportunity to intimidate prospective witnesses. Furthermore, most reasonable men would agree that a court appointed defense attorney will not
risk his reputation and career by indulging in unethical practices. Therefore, whatever the integrity of the accused, his counsel would serve as a
97
check on abusive and unethical activity.
Naturally the danger of these abuses is higher in cases involving
organized crime or wealthy defendants. It is submitted, however, that
opportunity for discovery, or lack of it, would have very little effect on
this activity. When elaborate resources or a criminal organization are
available to the defendant, restrictive discovery would not deter his witness-tampering. It is, furthermore, reasonable to assume that any guilty
defendant who desires to commit perjury will find a way based on his
personal knowledge of his acts, regardless of whether further discovery
92. The argument has been made that a relationship between early discovery and
perjury or witness intimidation has not been satisfactorily shown to exist. One court
dismissed the theory summarily: "The point is built one-sidedly of untested folklore."
United States v. Projansky, 44 F.R.D. 550, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
93. Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., has responded to the perjury
argument:
I should think rather that its complete fallacy has been starkly exposed through
the extensive and analogous experience in civil causes where liberal discovery
has been allowed and perjury has not been fostered. Indeed this experience has
suggested that liberal discovery, far from abetting, actually deters perjury and
fabrication.
Brennan, supra note 5, at 290-92.
94. In 1951, it was estimated that 60% of those charged with criminal offenses
could not afford to employ counsel. E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES
83 (1951).
95. See note 94 supra.
96. See LaFave, Alternatives to the Present Bail System, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 8,
10-12, wherein the author refers to the REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

(1963).

Some

sample figures of persons unable to make bail contained in the report are: St. Louis,
79%; Baltimore, 75%; Miami, 71%; San Francisco, 57%; Boston, 54%. Id. at 10.
97. See Brennan, supra note 5, at 291-92.
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is provided. 8 The perjury argument has become eroded over the years.
The fear of perjury has diminished perhaps because of the realization
that such abuses resulting from broad discovery can reasonably be expected in only a small minority of criminal cases99 and certainly should
not serve as a justification for greatly hindering all criminal defendants.
B.

The Lack of Reciprocity

In answer to the argument that open discovery works in the civil
area, therefore, it would work in criminal cases, the opponents of liberal
discovery contend that the civil experience is not relevant to the criminal
field. Several arguments have been advanced. First, the basis for pretrial discovery in civil cases - mutual exchange of evidence' 0 0 - is not
present in the criminal case. By the same token, it is argued, while a civil
trial is a search for truth by both sides, a criminal trial may not be. The
Government has a duty to protect the innocent and prosecute the guilty,
but the defense lawyer's only duty is to insure a fair trial and require the
Government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 1 It is submitted
that this "search for truth" argument is untenable. Ethical considerations
aside, the "search for truth" has become the goal of criminal justice,
if not the reality. Cooperation between prosecutor and defense counsel
has been imposed by the United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland10 2 to insure the emergence of the truth.
Second, the defendant's constitutional immunities - the right to remain silent - makes reciprocal disclosure impossible, 1 3 and thereby places
the prosecution at a disadvantage. 0 4 This second argument has been
attacked for two primary reasons; the protection which constitutional immunity affords a criminal defendant is exaggerated and the defendant
often pays for his silence if he chooses to exercise his privilege. 10 5
98. Pye, supra note 83, at 91.

99. See Pye, supra note 83, at 90-91.
100. See Flannery, supra note 83, at 78.
101. Id. Mr. Flannery cites motions to suppress illegally seized evidence as a

typical example of counsel's duty to his client which results in suppression of the
truth. Id. See generally Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MIcH. L. Riv. 1469 (1966).
102. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra.
103. See note 86 supra.
104. Goldstein, supra note 90, at 1185. This argument was articulated by Judge
Learned Hand in State v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). See text
accompanying note 82 supra. Judge Hand's position has been rejected as irrelevant
for assuming a "sporting theory of justice" - a theory no longer acceptable under
the modern view of criminal justice as a search for truth. See generally Brennan,
supra note 5.
105. Goldstein, supra note 90, at 1186. Under new Rule 16(c), if the court grants
defendant's discovery motion under Rule 16(a) (1) or (b), it can condition defendant's discovery by requiring defendant to permit the Government discovery of certain
items. The constitutional problems raised by this reciprocity condition are noted in
39 F.R.D. 69, 272-78 (1966). See also Orfield, The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 445, 450-51 (1966) ; Wright, supra note 2, at 327-28.
The defendant is required to disclose only material he intends to introduce
at trial; and, therefore, disclosure in advance merely regulates the presentation of
his case and does not violate any constitutional privilege of the defendant. See
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It has been asserted that, even with the expansion of the scope of
discovery rights of the accused and his constitutional rights in general,
the defendant does not enjoy every advantage of, and certainly no more
advantages than, the state.106 The exclusionary rule of evidence, as enunciated in Weeks v. United States, 07 is only of limited aid to the innocent
defendant or to the guilty defendant who neither confessed nor possessed
incriminating evidence.' 08 Furthermore, the protection the Constitution
affords the defendant against self-incrimination can be ineffective. Usually
a defendant must take the stand if he hopes to be acquitted; and when
he does so he is subject to revealing cross-examination by a well-informed
prosecutor who could impeach his credibility by bringing in evidence of
defendant's prior convictions. 10 9 If he avails himself of his privilege not
to testify, his failure to take the stand is so conspicuous that it is bound
to have an adverse effect on the jury, thereby requiring him to risk a
piercing cross-examination to counteract this effect." 0
Many jurisdictions have rules requiring the defendant to plead specially the defenses of insanity and alibi."' Furthermore, the accused must
submit to various physical examinations by the state in its search for
incriminating data.1 2 The state also has the power to make reasonable
searches and seizures for evidence" 3 and the power to subpoena witnesses. In addition, the prosecutor has all the scientific and manpower
resources of both his department and various federal, state and local law
enforcement agencies behind him while most criminal defendants are left
virtually unaided." 4 The indigent defendant is limited by the size of the
Traynor, supra note 3, at 247-48. If, however, the disclosure is constitutionally protected, may the benefits of discovery under Rule 16 be conditioned on the waiver of
these constitutionally protected rights? ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 45. See,
e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963). See generally Louisell, Criminal
Discovery and Self-Incrimination: Roger Traynor Confronts the Dilemma, 53 CALIF.
L. Rev. 89 (1965).
106. See generally Goldstein, supra note 90.
107. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court held that evidence obtained as a result of an
illegal arrest, search or seizure, conducted by federal authorities was inadmissible in
any federal court. In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), it was held that the
exclusionary rule was part of the fourth amendment and therefore applied to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.
108. Pye, supra note 83, at 89.
109. See Id.
110. See Goldstein, supra note 90, at 1186 & n.123. Based on statistics kept by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts for the year 1956 it was shown
that in:
a little over 99 per cent . . . of all the criminal cases tried in the eighty-six
judicial districts at the federal level, defendants who did not take the stand were
convicted by juries ....
The fact of the matter is that a defendant who does not
take the stand does not in reality enjoy any longer the presumption of innocence.
Williams, The Trial of a Criminal Case, 29 N.Y.S.B. BULL. 36, 42 (1957).
111. For a typical rule compelling notice of alibi and insanity defenses, see N.J.R.
§§ 3:11 & 3:12. Failure to give the required notice can result in defendant being barred
from proving the alibi. See Hill, supra note 3, at § 11:02[3].
112. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See also Garber, The
Growth of Criminal Discovery, 1 CRIM. L.Q. 3, 5 (1962) ; Goldstein, supra note 90,
at 1189-90 & nn. 133-36.
113. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
114. See Goldstein, supra note 90, at 1183 & n.11l.
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Defender Association's budget and other defendants are limited by their
own resources. Not only is considerable use made of the accused by the
police and prosecution, but all witnesses for both sides are subjected to
interrogation by the prosecution before trial either voluntarily or by being
subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury." 5 If it is done before the
grand jury, in effect, the prosecutor conducts a "deposition" without the
presence of either the accused or his counsel.1 16 While the minutes of the
grand jury hearing are readily available to the prosecutor, it is extremely
difficult for the defendant to acquire them for examination." 7
C. The Effectiveness of Informal Procedures
A persuasive argument against any drastic changes in criminal discovery is that reform toward liberalization is actually not necessary. In
practice there is an informal, free exchange of information between the
prosecutor and the defense attorney. Prosecutors as a matter of good
policy open their files to defense counsel, refusing this privilege only when
they believe the particular defense attorney is not to be trusted with the
information or will otherwise abuse the privilege. 8 This practice leads
to elimination of unnecessary issues, guilty pleas when the defense attorney is shown the strength of the state's case, and dismissals when the
defense attorney exhibits an airtight defense. In effect, this argument
seems to implore the rule makers to leave well enough alone and insists
that the system functions well enough for those who have to work within it.
However, the fallacy of this argument is that the vast majority of
defense discovery is dependent on an act of good will by the prosecutor." 9
All too often a "trustworthy" defense attorney is an amiable plea negotiator, or one who does not give the assistant district attorneys a difficult
time. 120 A defense attorney who uses the discovered information to construct a solid defense and prepare effective cross-examination of state's
witnesses could very well be labeled "untrustworthy" and banned from
the files.' 2 1 The opportunity for inequality under this system is unlimited,
and makes more urgent the need for consistent, pervasive, and formal pretrial discovery. The defendant's discovery should not be subject to the
115. See Goldstein, supra note 90, at 1191. This does not mean that the prosecution can compel defendant to disclose the names of his witnesses.
116. See Goldstein, supra note 90, at 1191. See generally Blair v. United States,
250 U.S. 273, 279-81 (1919).
117. See pp. 662-63 supra.
118. This argument is discussed in Pre-Trial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31
BROOKLYN L. R~v. 320, 329 (1965).
119. In a survey, Assistant United States Attorneys and defense counsel were
asked to indicate the factors they thought most greatly affected the prosecutor's
decision to grant informal discovery. Of nine categories the one most often cited as
the factor favoring discovery was the "United States Attorney's personal acquaintance
with prosecutors polled and eighty-eight per cent of the defense counsels polled concurred in this factor." Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33 F.R.D. 47, 116 (1963).
120. See Pye, supra note 83, at 85.
121. Id.
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whim of the prosecution; and the decision of what evidence should be
made available to defendant should not hinge on the prosecutor's opinion
of either the accused or his counsel.
D.

A Positive Case for Liberal Discovery

It could be argued that defendant needs to discover only the basic
case against him and certain evidence which will be used against him at
trial. Given the prosecutor's heavy burden of proof, effective rebuttal by
defendant should be all that is necessary to win acquittal; and therefore,
discovery should be geared to this rebuttal on cross-examination. However, in order for the accused to present his strongest and most effective
defense, he must have all the evidence before him. Discovery, therefore,
must go beyond the function of preparing for cross-examination and impeachment and serve the positive function of providing defendant with
the information from which to construct an affirmative case.
The provisions for discovery by the defendant that do exist are generally concerned with perpetuation of testimony and matters not crucial
to the charge 122 and are, therefore, ineffective 1 23 in helping the accused's
attorney prepare a complete defense. The guilty defendant at least has
a basic knowledge of the crime he is charged with, but the defendant who
is innocent has no idea of the "facts" and will be of no help to his attorney in preparing his defense. Similarly, the defendant who was intoxicated at the time of his criminal act or the defendant suffering from
mental illness will be of no aid to his attorney. 124 These impediments
aside, the typical criminal defendant is not gifted with an ability to accurately remember necessary details of his act and surrounding circumstances; nor does he possess the legal acumen required to sort out and
analyze those facts which are critical to a determination of guilt, innoence, or mitigation. 125 His attorney must be able to get this information
12 6
from some source other than the accused.
It has also been urged that the entire argument for liberal discovery
could be justified on one premise:
[A] defendant whether guilty or not should be entitled to a fair
trial. If freedom of access to information is a fundamental ingredient
of this right, he must be entitled to the type of discovery which will
give him this access - without
reference to what other advantages
27

the law may provide him.'
122. See Goldstein, supra note 90, at 1181. For example, FED. R. CRIM. P. 15,
limits the taking of depositions to situations where the witness will be otherwise
unavailable at trial.
123. Id.
124. See Pye, supra, note 83, at 82-83.
125. Id. at 83.
126. Broad discovery is necessary to enable defense counsel to effectively crossexamine state's witnesses especially when defendant is indigent and cannot finance
private investigation. In order to adequately advise his client how to plead, counsel
must be able to discover the facts of the case. Id.
127. Pye, supra note 83, at 90. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 43; Goldstein, supra note 90; Louisell, supra note 65; Developments in the Law -
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MODELS FOR REFORM

Thus far an attempt has been made to expose the various procedural
deficiencies of pretrial criminal discovery, to examine certain proposals for
reform, and to evaluate the policy arguments advanced on either side of
the issue of liberalizing discovery for the defendant. The remainder of this
Comment will deal with discovery procedures as practiced in England,
California, New Jersey, and Vermont in an attempt to draw on the discovery experiences of these jurisdictions in arriving at a viable solution
to the problems of pretrial criminal discovery raised above.
A.

The British Committal Proceeding:128 Some Answers

"The English preliminary hearing-deposition procedure is the quintessence of discovery - indeed to many American defense lawyers, including the federal criminal practitioner, it is the very ideal of discovery."'129 This general concept of the British committal proceeding has
prompted commentators to advocate expansion of our own preliminary
hearing based on its British counterpart as the appropriate method to
affect significant reform of pretrial criminal discovery. 18 0 A brief sketch
of the committal proceeding in England in relation to its discovery function will help to place their faith in perspective.
The dual function of the American preliminary hearing, a device for
establishing probable cause to bind over the accused for the grand jury
and witness discovery, is also a characteristic of the British committal
proceeding. However, in Britain the discovery function has replaced the
screening function as the proceeding's primary purpose. 31 The breadth
of required disclosure would draw violent protest from the traditional
American prosecutor. The prosecution in England is required to produce
at the committal proceeding all the witnesses and evidence intended for
use at trial.132 To encompass all evidence discovered by the prosecution
subsequent to the proceeding, the British prosecutor is required to serve
the defendant with a notice of additional evidence. 13 3 In recent years the
scope of the notice of additional evidence has been enlarged and, with
the defendant's consent, much evidence traditionally disclosed at the proceeding can be disclosed via a notice of additional evidence. 13 4 This trend
128. For an excellent analysis of the British committal proceeding, see A. Krulwich, The Committal Proceeding In England: Its Uses and Abuses, (unpublished
thesis), Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure, Georgetown University Law Center
(draft copy prepared for use of the Policy Board). P. DtVLIN THx CRIMINAL
PROSIcUTION IN ENGLAND 112-16 (1958);

Louisell, supra note 69, at 64-67.

129. Louisell, supra note 65, at 64-65.
130. Compare Goldstein, supra note 90, at 1193, with Rezneck, supra note 2, at
1303-04 & nn. 98 & 99.
131. See A. KRULWICH, supra note 128, at 31.
132. Id. See P. DXVLIN, supra note 128, at 112; Louisell, supra note 65, at 65-66
& n.37; Martin, The PreliminaryHearing: Canadian Practice, 1 J. CRiM. L. (ENG.)
107, 117-18 (1937).
133. See P. DEvLIN, supra note 128, at 93; A. KRULWIcH, supra note 128, at 31;
Louisell, supra note 65, at 66 & n.38. See for comparison FzD. R. CRIM. P. 16(g).

134. A. KRULWICH, supra note 128, at 32.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/4
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served the practical function of expediting what can otherwise be a very
tedious and time consuming process. 18 5 In addition, British prosecutors
and defense attorneys utilize informal agreements as a means of discovery
in much the same manner as American prosecutors and defense attorneys
do.'8 6 The value of the committal proceeding goes beyond the discovery
of material evidence. Not only does the defendant obtain a fairly comprehensive view of the government's case, but the chief witnesses for
the prosecution are subjected to careful scrutiny by defense counsel and
counsel can "judge their potential for damage by demeanor as well as
testimony.'

a7

The presence or absence of counsel at the proceeding ordinarily has
little effect on whether or not the defendant secures a discharge. 88 The
value of counsel is in maximizing the effectiveness of the proceeding
as a discovery device. 13 9 It was noted in a field observation of the committal proceeding that the defense rarely called witnesses or argued
strongly to avoid committal.' 40 Cross-examination was a much more frequent practice of the defense counsel, and even if defense counsel took
no active part in the proceeding he took "copious" notes.141 With respect
to discovery, therefore, the importance of counsel at the committal proceeding is apparent. As to whether legal aid will be provided, the seriousness and complexity of the particular case is weighted against the cost to
the public.1 42 When the case is routine or the defendant has confessed to
the police and will plead guilty at trial, counsel can do little at this early
148
pretrial stage and is considered a luxury.
The English procedure is not as effective as it might be, limiting evidence available for disclosure to those items which are admissible at trial
and which the prosecutor intends to offer.14 4 This limitation excludes from
discovery much information needed to adequately prepare for trial. While
the English committal proceeding is not a panacea for securing all of
defendant's discovery needs, 145 it has been suggested that it could provide
a valuable model for reforming the American preliminary hearing into
an effective discovery device. 146 However, a closer analysis of the opera-

tion of this procedure will uncover certain inherent difficulties in implementing this reform.
135. See Louisell, supra note 65, at 65:
The process of recording the substance of each witness's testimony, then reading

it to him to procure his signature while laborious and tedious, produces fullfledged depositions.
136. See A. KRULWICH, supra note 128, at 32; Louisell, supra note 65, at 67 &n.4 2.

137. Id. at 34.
138. Id. at 37.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 40.
141. Id. at 41.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. This is the same limitation found in the Advisory Committee's proposed
standards. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at § 2.1 (a) (i).
145. See Louisell, supra note 65, at 66.
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The Operation Of The Preliminary Examination

Formally, the preliminary examination's raison d'etre is to function
as a post-arrest, pretrial screening device to determine if probable cause
exists to believe that the accused committed the crime charged so that he
may be incarcerated or required to post bond to insure his appearance at
subsequent stages of prosecution. 147 As a practical matter, the hearing
is not very effective toward this end. 148 In most jurisdictions it is a sufficient showing if the prosecution presents basic evidence in support of
each element of the offense. 149 As a rule defense counsel is either not
present or ill-prepared to effectively test the sufficiency of the evidence
against the accused ;l50 and, therefore, the prosecution can avoid going
beyond a token presentation of evidence and minimum exposure of
witnesses.
Apart from its screening function, the preliminary examination has
been recognized as an important discovery device for the defense by commentators' 51 and courts' 5" alike. By hearing the prosecution's witnesses
147. See AMSTERDAM, SEGAL & MILLER, supra note 3, at § 128; Note, The Preliminary Hearing - An Interest Analysis, 51 IOWA L. REv. 164 (1965) ; Commonwealth
ex rel. Sukaly v. Maroney, 201 Pa. Super. 117, 191 A.2d 893 (1963).
See also
Comment, The Preliminary Examination in the Federal System: A
Proposal for
Rule Change, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1416 (1968).
148. See Goldstein, supra note 90, at 1166-69. For historical development
of
preliminary examination, see Comment, supra note 147, at 1416-19.
149. See Goldstein, supra note 90, at 1166.
150. Id. at 1167.
151. See generally AMSTERDAM, SEGAL & MILLER, supra note 3, at §§
124-47;
Goldstein, supra note 90, at 1166-69; Rezneck, supra note 3, at § 10.06[2]
; Note, 51
IOWA L. REv. 164 (1965) ; Comment, supra note 147;
E. BARRETT PRETTYMAN
FELLOWS, 1965-1966, THE PRELIMINARY HEARING IN THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA
7-8 (1967), in which it was stated that:
it]here is currently a judicial dispute as to whether discovery is another
nized purpose of a preliminary hearing. From the perspective of the defense recogcounsel, however, there is no doubt that the hearing is a critical tool in trial preparation.
If used properly, the crucial facts of the government's case ... can be discovered.
Moreover, since the hearing is transcribed or recorded, the testimony is
preserved
for potential trial use in refreshing recollection or impeachment. For
these reasons, preliminary hearings should never be waived.
152. For decisions which recognize the separate functions of the preliminary
ing and the grand jury indictment by holding denial of preliminary hearing hearis not
cured by a supervening indictment, see Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557 (D.C.
Dancy v. United States, 361 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Blue v. United Cir. 1967) ;
States, 342
F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965) ; United States
ex rel.
Wheeler v. Flood, 269 F. Supp. 194 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
Several other decisions have discussed the preliminary hearing as affording
defendant certain rights required under due process, i.e., an attorney who
mental in fulfilling the discovery function and protecting the constitutional is instrurights of
the defendant. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) ; White v. Maryland,
373
U.S. 59 (1963) ; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
The discovery function of the hearing needs judicial recognition if the hearing
is to be effective. This "unofficial" function "has more claim to judicial
recognition
than the 'acquittal' function because, although not required by the legislated
purpose
of preliminary hearings, it is also not inconsistent with that purpose."
AMSTRDAM,
SEGAL & MILLER, supra note 3, at § 133. One lower court took a
in this direction
by enforcing the right to a preliminary hearing by reversing a step
valid
no other reason but that a preliminary hearing had been denied. Manorconviction for
v. State, 221
Ga. 866, 148 S.E.2d 305 (1966).
In Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), discovery
was
accepted as a main purpose of the preliminary examination, and the
District of
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/4
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and cross-examining them, 153 the defense attorney can learn at least enough
about what he will have to face at trial to avoid complete surprise. By
observing the prosecution's witnesses on the stand at the preliminary
examination the defense attorney can gain a subjective feel for the strength
of their testimony and their general demeanor. This subjective knowledge
can prove important in the approach the defense counsel will take toward
these witnesses at trial, and is something he cannot get from a written
statement. This hearing also serves to perpetuate effective cross-examination of witnesses and lay the groundwork for impeachment of credibility
154
or testimony at trial.
In sum, the preliminary examination, if it were effectively administered
as a discovery device, would serve three functions for the defendant: to
compel the state to meet its burden of proof or have the charge against
the accused reduced or dismissed ;155 to provide effective discovery of the
state's evidence; and to perpetuate testimony for use as impeachment
evidence at trial.' 58 However, to be effective three requirements would have
to be provided: a greater evidentiary burden on the state to satisfy the
discovery function of the examination apart from its screening function;
the presence of counsel ;15T and adequate preparation by defense counsel so
Columbia Legal Aid Act, 2 D.C. Code §§ 2201-2210, was interpreted as requiring that
the accused be advised of the availability of counsel at that time.
It has generally been thought that the purpose of a preliminary hearing is to afford
the accused . . . (2) a chance to learn in advance of trial the foundation of the
charge and the evidence that will comprise the government's case against him.
Id. at 901. The court in Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1964),
stated that under Fg. R. CRIM. P. 5(c), the accused is entitled to cross-examine all
witnesses at the preliminary examination upon whose testimony the government will
rely on at trial.
153. See AMSTERDAM, SEGAL & MILLER, supra note 3, at § 139. See also Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
154. See AMSTERDAM, SEGAL & MILLER, supra note 3, at § 139.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. It has been argued that the "skeletal" nature of the preliminary examination
is preserved by the absence of counsel. See Goldstein, supra note 90, at 1166-67.
Because binding over is recognized as the function of the hearing, very little thought
is given to the rights of the accused at this early stage.
The presence of counsel could be the greatest factor in transforming the
preliminary examination from a frequently waived, ineffective proceeding into a
valuable step in the criminal process. See Rezneck, supra note 2, at 1305 & n.100.
Two cases are particularly significant to the question of providing counsel at
the preliminary examination. In Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), the Court
held that the defendant had been denied due process when he pleaded not guilty at
arraignment on an indictment for a capital offense without the assistance of counsel
and without having waived his right to counsel. In White v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
59 (1963), the Court in a per curiam opinion relied on Hamilton and stated that
defendant's plea of guilty at the preliminary hearing made without the assistance of
counsel and the subsequent use of that guilty plea as evidence at trial deprived defendant of due process of law. In effect, under these facts, the preliminary hearing was a
"critical stage" and counsel was required. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965),
in which the Court held that admission into evidence of testimony taken at the
preliminary examination at which defendant, without the assistance of counsel, was
unable to effectively cross-examine state's witnesses denied him his right to confront
his accusers.
The Court, therefore, has decided cases on the formal aspects of the hearingpleading
and confrontation-thereby
avoiding
question
whether 1970
the discovery
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that he may make maximum use of the hearing. 158 A further obstacle to
the effectiveness of the preliminary examination involves tactical evasion
of the hearing by the prosecution through a continuance until a grand
jury indictment has been returned. 159 Once the prosecution has secured
a grand jury indictment, most courts will not permit a preliminary examination on the basis that a need for one no longer exists ;160 if an indictment has been returned, certainly there is no need to test the sufficiency
of the evidence at a preliminary examination.
There are also practical difficulties in expanding the preliminary hearing into an effective discovery device. Three very practical and immediate
agruments against such an expansion are: lack of time to properly achieve
its purpose as a discovery device; lack of manpower to properly administer
the hearing; and lack of funds to institute such a reform and sustain it
once instituted.
It is safe to generalize that a tremendous backlog exists in the criminal
courts, making time of the essence and placing a premium on time-saving
devices. To administer an expanded preliminary examination would require the participation of a judge for what could be a sustained period of
time, in addition to requiring the efforts of the prosecutor and defense
attorney before the hearing to adequately prepare for it as well as during
the hearing. Assuming the ideal - that funds and resources were available for such expansion - there is a very real danger of an expanded
preliminary hearing becoming a "trial before the trial." For these reasons
the preliminary hearings would appear not to be the best vehicle for
pretrial discovery.
function of the preliminary examination creates a "critical stage" of the process
requiring counsel.
When Hamilton and White are read in ronjunction, they suggest a possible
standard for deciding what is a "critical stage" requiring counsel. See United States
ex rel. Cooper v. Reincke, 333 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964),
in which the court engaged this line of analysis:
From Hamilton v. Alabama and White v. Maryland, it is plain that there
is no arbitrary point in time at which the right to counsel attaches in pre-trial
proceedings .... Rather, the 'critical' point is to be determined both from the
nature of the proceedings and from that which actually occurs in each case.
Id. at 611.
It would appear that at any stage where the advice or assistance of counsel
could be important to the outcome of the case qualifies it as a "critical stage." To the
extent that discovery is critical to the defendant, it would follow that counsel must be
provided. See AMSTERDAM, SEGAL & MILLER, supra note 3, at § 133.
158. See AMSTERDAM, SEGAL & MILLER, supra note 3, at § 139, for caveats in using
the preliminary hearing as a tool of the defense.
159. See generally Weinberg & Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation To Avoid
the Preliminary Hearing: An Analysis of Section 303 of the Federal Magistrate's Act
of 1968, 67 MIcH. L. Rgv. 1361 (1969) ; Comment, supra note 147, for a thorough
analysis of this method of avoiding the preliminary hearing and a proposed remedy.
160. See Crump v. Anderson, 352 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1965), in which the court
affirmed the dismissal of the preliminary examination after an indictment had been
returned during an eleven day delay while defendant awaited appointment of counsel.
But see note 152 supra.
The characterization of the preliminary hearing as a device to find probable
cause rather than as a discovery device and failure to distinguish its purpose from
that of the grand jury hearing would insure that courts will continue to find no need
for a preliminary hearing once an indictment has been returned. See Comment, supra
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss3/4
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California, New Jersey and Vermont:''
Three Solutions

A relatively broad discovery policy operates in California largely as
the result of appellate decisions.16 2 A defendant may discover the names
and addresses of witnesses,' 6 8 photographs,16 4 results of scientific and other
investigations, 6 5 and statements of witnesses to the police 66 or prosecutor. 167 All the defendant must show, generally, is inability to readily
obtain the information through his own efforts, ignorance of the contents
of the material sought, and that the material may aid him in preparation
for trial.' 66 Once defendant has made such a showing, discovery is available as a matter of right in the interest of a fair trial, 169 absent the prosecu70
tion demonstrating that disclosure will lead to abuse.
Despite California's apparent liberality, especially in the area of witness discovery, its discovery procedures may still fall short of achieving
the pretrial discovery necessary to meet the expanding concept of a fair
trial. 17' As noted, the discovery rights of the defendant are judicially
made, and therefore the scope of these rights will be largely determined
by the views on discovery of the trial judge before whom each individual
defendant must appear.172 In addition, California is reluctant to permit
pretrial discovery depositions 178 to be taken by defense counsel, and therefore, lags behind several more progressive jurisdictions, 74 While California is no longer the vanguard of criminal discovery, it is illustrative
of the effectiveness of a reform-minded judiciary in solving certain discovery problems.
Following the direction of Chief Justice Weintraub after the New
Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. Tate,1 a special judicial
161. For a partial list of other states which have updated their criminal discovery
rules, see note 7 supra.
162. See Murphy, supra note 3; Traynor, supra note 3, at 243-50.
163. E.g., People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 994, 376 U.S. 939 (1964) (identity of prosecution witnesses
withheld until twenty-four hours before they were to testify on showing that they
might be subject to tampering). For discussion, see Traynor, supra note 3, at 244.
164. E.g., Norton v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. App. 2d 133, 136, 343 P.2d 139,
141 (1959). For discussion, see Traynor, supra note 3, at 244.
165. E.g., Brenard v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 2d 314, 318, 341 P.2d 743,
746 (1959). For discussion, see Traynor, supra note 3, at 244.
166. E.g., People v. Garner, 57 Cal. 2d 135, 142, 367 P.2d 680, 684, 18 Cal. Rptr.
40, 44 (1961). See Traynor, supra note 3, at 244.
167. Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 340 P.2d 593 (1959).
168. E.g., Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 72, 346 P.2d 407 (1959). See
Traynor, supra note 3, at 244.
169. See Hill, supra note 3, at § 11.03[3].
170. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424
(1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 994, 376 U.S. 939 (1964) ; Hill, supra note 3, § 11.03(3],
at 11-39.
171. See Hill, supra note 3, at § 11.04[1] ; Murphy, supra note 3, at 13.
172. See Hill, supra note 3, § 11-03[3], at 11-38; Margolin, Toward Effective
Criminal Discovery in California - A Practioner's View, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 1040,
1059 (1968).
173. E.g., People v. Mersino, 237 Cal. App. 2d 265, 46 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1965). See
Hill, supra note 3, § 11.04[1], at 11-52.
174. See discussion pp. 680-82 infra.
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seminar on criminal discovery was held for the express purpose of liberalizing New Jersey's criminal discovery procedures.
The New Jersey committee 176 provided for mandatory disclosure of
certain items of evidence. The defendant, upon motion by him, must be
permitted access to any relevant:
(i) designated books, tangible objects, papers or documents obtained
from or belonging to him; (ii) exculpatory information or material;
(iii) any written or recorded statements or confessions made by the
defendant or copies thereof; (iv) defendant's grand jury testimony if
a transcript thereof has already been obtained by the prosecuting
attorney . . . and if not, the court shall order such transcript to be
prepared and a copy thereof furnished to defendant . . . (v) the

results of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests . . .
made in connection with the matter
77

prior convictions of the defendant.

. . .

(vi) reports or records of

The Rule left other items up to the discretion of the court upon the
defendant's showing of an inability to obtain the material elsewhere
following a good faith effort and a need to discover such material.
[A]bsent a showing of good cause to the contrary the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to permit the defendant to inspect . . .
books, papers, documents, or tangible objects . . . which are within
1 78

the possession, custody or control of the State.

Under a further provision the court may direct the prosecuting attorney
to make available to the defendant witnesses' names, addresses, statements,
and grand jury testimony. 17 0 In addition, the court may order the prosecuting attorney to cooperate with the defense attorney in his efforts to
procure interviews with state's witnesses.
The committee, while affording broad discovery in its proposals, was
reluctant to permit defendant the unrestricted right to take depositions of
176. For extensive discussion of the new rules, see Report of N.J. Supreme Court's
Special Committee an Criminal Discovery, 90 N.J.L.J. INDSX 214 (April 6, 1967)
[hereinafter cited as N.J. Special Committee Report].
177. N.J.R. § 3:13-3(a), adopts the Committee's proposal for mandatory discovery with minor variation. See N.J. Special Committee Report, supra note 176.
178. N.J.R. § 3:13-3(b). See N.J. Special Committee Report, supra note 176.
179. See N.J.R. § 3:13-3, which permits defendant wide witness discovery absent
a showing of cause to deny this discovery by the prosecution and conditioned on defen-

dant's willingness to disclose similar information. The rule provides for discovery of:
(1) The names and addresses of all persons known to the prosecution to have
relevant evidence and a list of persons who will be used by the state as
witnesses at trial;
(2) The statements made by such persons and any relevant records of prior
convictions; and
(3) The grand jury testimony of such persons.
For a discussion on the discovery of witness statements, see Rezneck, supra note 3, at
§ 10.02[5] [b].
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witnesses.' 80 It justifies its reluctance in light of the broad witness discovery already provided under proposed rule 3:13-3(c). However, if the
court should conclude that depositions are to be permitted, the committee
would require a showing that defendant made an unsuccessful attempt to
obtain an interview with a witness and the witness made no recorded
statement to the police or prosecutor, or the recorded statement furnished
the defendant indicates a need for a deposition. 181
The State of Vermont, in 1961, exhibited no such reluctance when it
enacted a criminal deposition statute,'8 2 the first in any state. The statute
provides in pertinent part:
A respondent in a criminal cause at any time after the filing of an indictment, information or complaint, may take the deposition of a witness, upon motion and notice to the state and other respondents, and
on showing that the witness's testimony may be material or relevant on
183
the trial or of assistance in the preparation of his defense ....
In its decision in State v. Mahoney18 4 the Supreme Court of Vermont left
no doubt as to the application of the statute.
The legislature, by this enactment has granted a right of unlimited discovery to a respondent in a criminal cause. Whatever may be the opin180. In State v. Tate, 47 N.J. 352, 221 A.2d 12 (1966), Chief Justice Weintraub,

in addition to drawing distinctions with the civil deposition set forth three basic reasons

for denying depositions:
(1) The criminal process already overburdened to the point where a speedy
disposition of the case is almost impossible, will be even more drawn out
if depositions become a routine method of discovery;
(2) Routine discovery by deposition would impose tremendous financial burdens on the state; and
(3) The added burden of depositions on victims and other witnesses might
discourage their cooperation.
Id. at 356-57, 221 A.2d at 14-15.
For an excellent review of the taking of criminal depositions, see Hill, supra
note 3, at §§ 11.04[1]-11.04[4].
181. See N.J. Special Committee Report, supra note 176, at 214.
182. 5 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6721 (1961). For brief history of the evolution of
the statute, see Langrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J.
732 (1967). See Hill, supra note 3, at §§ 11.04[1]-11.04[4]. In addition to Vermont,
other states have adopted less far reaching deposition procedures. OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 2945.50 (1965), provides basically that the defendant or prosecution may
request to depose "any witness." While no standard is formally required to determine
when a deposition may be taken, the Ohio supreme court suggested that the trial
judge in exercising his discretion may utilize "civil guidelines." State ex rel. Jackman
v. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St. 2d 159, 224 N.E.2d 906 (1967). Tzx. CODt
CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 39.14 (1965), significantly extended this states partial discovery procedure by providing for pretrial inspection of the defendant's written statements and the state's chief evidence. T~x. COD CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.02 (1965),
allows defendant to depose witnesses if he shows "good reason." FLA. R. CRIM. P.
1.220(f), affords the defendant a qualified right to depose any person "who may have
information relevant to the offense charged . . ." or information relevant to the
accused's defense. Indiana, like California, has developed its criminal discovery deposition procedure through appellate decisions evolving from Burn's IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-1610 (1956), a narrowly drawn perpetuation of evidence statute, to a relatively
broad witness discovery procedure exceeded only by Vermont. If the state fails to
show a "paramount interest" in nondisclosure, the trial court's discretion is limited to
curbing "fishing expeditions." See Howard v. State, __ Ind.
,
_, 244 N.E.2d 127,
128 (1969) ; Hill, supra note 3, at § 11.04[4].
183. 5 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6721 (1961).
184. 122 Vt. 456, 176 A.2d 747 (1961).
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ion of the Justices of this Court, as individuals, as to the possible consequence of a legislative act, if the meaning is plain we cannot regard
the consequences, for that would be assuming legislative authority. 8 5
A questionnaire was circulated among the Vermont bar concerning
the effect of this deposition procedure on the state's criminal justice system.
The conclusion was that the depositions decreased the likelihood of trial
because it gave the defendant a chance to find out the actual strength of
the state's case and removed the practice of "bluffing" thereby encouraging
defense counsel and prosecutor to work together. 8 6 According to one
commentator, the evils' 8 7 envisioned when discovery was liberalized never
materialized; and "virtually all of the experience available under the expanded discovery procedure has indicated an improvement in the administration of the criminal laws."' 88
V.

EFFECTIVE USE OF PRETRIAL STAGES: A

PROPOSAL

The proposed Rule set forth below is an attempt to draw together what
appears to be the most effective aspects of discovery procedures outlined
above and to implement certain policy considerations. Since Rule 16 is a
relatively progressive discovery rule and serves as a model for many jurisdictions, it will be utilized as the basic structure for the following proposal.
A.

Proposed Revision of Rule 16189

(a) Defendant's Statements; Reports of Examinations and Tests;
Defendant's Grand Jury Testimony; Witness List and Statements; Prior
Criminal Record of Witness; Favorable Evidence. Except as provided
for in subsection (e), the court shall, upon motion of a defendant, order
the attorney for the government to permit the defendant to inspect and
copy or photograph any [relevant] (1) written or recorded statements or
confessions made by the defendant or his co-defendant,190 or copies thereof,
within the possession, custody, or control of the government, the existence
of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known,
to the attorney for the government, (2) results or reports of physical or
mental examinations made in connection with the particular case, or copies
thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the government, the
existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may
become known, to the attorney for the government, (3) recorded and
unrecorded testimony of the defendant or his co-defendant'9 ' before a
185. 122 Vt. 456, 462, 176 A.2d 747, 751 (1961).
186. See Langrock, supra note 182, at 734.
187. See discussion pp. 668-70 supra.
188. See Langrock, supra note 182, at 734.
189. All proposed additions and revisions are noted in italics and important phrases
which have been deleted are indicated in brackets. See supra note 2, for the text of
present Rule 16. For an excellent analysis of Rule 16 and proposals for reform, see
JUDICIAL CONVARENCE, supra note 57, at 35-58.
190. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 58-61.
191. Id. at 70-71. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); JUDICIAL
CON "RNC4,supra note 57, at 36, 49.
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grand jury, (4) the names and addresses of potential witnesses regardless
of use at trial along with a brief but revealing transcription of any statement given to the prosecution that may aid defendant in preparation for
trial'92 within the possession, custody, or control of the government, the
existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become
known to the attorney for the government, (5) any prior criminal record
of any potential witness,19 and (6) any favorable evidence'" which in
any manner may aid the defendant in preparation for trial within the
possession, custody, or control of the government, the existence of which
is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the
attorney for the government.
(b) Other Books, Papers, Documents, Tangible Objects or Places.
Upon motion of a defendant the court [may] shall order the attorney for
the government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph
books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings, or places, or copies
or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or control of
the government upon a showing [of materiality to the preparation of his
defense and that the request is reasonable] that the request may aid the
defendant in preparation for trial. [Except as provided in subdivision
(a) (2), this rule does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports,
memoranda, or other internal government documents made by government agents in connection with the investigation or prosecution of the case,
or of statements made by government witnesses (other than the defendant)
to agents of the government except as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3500.]
(c) Discovery by the Government. [If the court grants relief sought
by the defendant under subdivision (a) (2) or subdivision (b) of this
rule, it may, upon motion of the government, condition its order by requiring that the defendant permit the government to inspect and copy or
photograph scientific or medical reports, books, papers, documents, tangible
objects, or copies or portions thereof, which are within his possession,
custody or control, upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the
government's case and that the request is reasonable and which the defendant intends to produce at the trial.] Upon motion of the government
the court may order the defendant to permit the government to inspect and
copy or photograph scientific or medical reports, books, papers, documents,
192. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 56-58; Hill, supra note 3, at §
11.03(1] ; JUDICIAL CONS'RrNCE, supra note 57, at 37, 46-47, 51-52; FLA. R. CRIM. P.

1.220 (1968); N.J.R. § 3:13-3(c) (1969).
For cases construing "statements," see, e.g., Hanks v. United States, 388
F.2d 171 (10th Cir. 1968) (Jencks Act statement confined to defendant's "own
words") ; United States v. Scharf, 267 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (memorandum
which includes the substance of defendant's testimony) ; United States v. Morrison,
43 F.R.D. 516 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (summaries).
193. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 69-70.
194. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); JUDICIAL CONFEURNC, supra
note 57, at 50-51.
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tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof, which the defendant intends
to produce at the trial and which are within his possession, custody, or
control, upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the government's case and that the request is reasonable; and names and addresses
of potential witnesses the existence of which is known or by the exercise
of due diligence may become known, to the defense attorney.
(d) Time, Place and Manner of Discovery and Inspection. Unchanged.
(e) Protective Orders. The above sections notwithstanding, the following categories of evidence may be exempt from disclosure upon sufficient showing by a party that: (1) evidence, if disclosed, would significantly
compromise the national security; (2) evidence, if disclosed, would significantly hinder a present investigation of a related criminal cause; and (3)
reports, memoranda, and other tangible things are the product of an
attorney's thinking process and reflect tactical information as opposed to
evidentiary material.195
Upon motion by the affected party, the court may permit that party
to make such showing, in whole or part, in the form of a written statement
to be inspected by the court [in camera]. If the court enters an order
granting relief following a suficient showing [in camera], the entire test
of the party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the records of
the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an
appeal by the opposing party.
(f) Time of Motions. Unchanged.
(g) Continuing Duty to Disclose; Failure to Comply. Unchanged.
(h) A defendant at any time after the filing of an indictment, information or complaint may take the deposition of any witness upon proper
motion to the court and notice to the government, and on a showing that
196
the deponent's testimony may aid the defendant in preparationfor trial.
B.

Commentary

19 7
The proposed statute utilizes the practice of informal discovery
between prosecutor and defense attorney and makes it a formal requirement. There are four significant changes in proposed Rule 16(a) and (b) :
(1) mandatory rather than discretionary discovery ;198 (2) defendant need

195. For comparison, see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) ; Hill, supra
note 3, at § 11.03[2]; C. WRIGHT, FDXRAL COURTS § 82 (1963); ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 7, at § 2.6(a) ; Note, "Work Product" in Criminal Discovery, 1966 WASH.

U.L.Q. 321.

196. This subsection supersedes FD. R. CRIM. P. 15. See note 39 supra. Compare
Proposed Fvo. R. CRIM. P. 16(h), with FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.220(f) ; OHIO Rzv. CODE
ANN. § 2945.50 (1965) ; T&x. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.02-03 (1965) ; 5 VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6721 (1961).
197. See pp. 672-73 supra.
198. See note 58 supra. The Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference makes
mandatory government disclosure of: (1) statement of defendant; (2) statement of
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not show that the evidence he seeks is relevant in the strict sense of the
term; (3) no "at trial" limitation on the evidence the prosecution must
disclose; and (4) expanded categories of evidence discoverable by the
defendant. 199 By requiring broad, early discovery the purposes to be acchieved are to avoid delays at trial, to facilitate proof and proper preparation
for trial, and to encourage plea negotiation and early disposition of the case.
By deleting the exercise of the court's discretion at the initial request
for disclosure and requiring a party to come forward with a sufficient showing of cause under the proposed protective order provision, the revised
statute greatly inhibits the emasculating effect of "the court's discretion"
200
on pretrial criminal discovery.
The proposed Rule has deleted the familiar evidentiary limitation of
relevance and, adopting the Vermont approach, requires only that the evidence sought in some manner affect the defendant's case. 2 1 The difficulties of requiring a show of relevance at the pretrial stages have been
discussed previously. 20 2 The ABA Advisory Committee, while recognizing

these problems, justifies the inclusion of a "relevancy" standard by asserting that the concept is a familiar one and discovery would be unworkable
without this criterion. 203 The standard set forth in proposed Rule 16(a)
and (b) hopefully will insure that the prosecutor and trial judge will not
be "stingy" in interpreting the meaning of "relevance," as requested by
the Advisory Committee.20 4
The "at trial" 205 limitation is not included in the proposed revision of
Rule 16. In addition to avoiding surprise at trial and providing defendant
with the opportunity to effectively rebut government evidence, discovery
should aid defendant in preparing a positive defense to the charge. This
function of discovery requires disclosure of evidence which the Government would not be inclined to use at trial, i.e., a witness's inability to
identify the defendant or a description of the perpetrator of the act which
does not meet the physical appearance of the defendant. 20 6 There are, in
addition, various bits of evidence possibly insignificant to the prosecution,
which could provide the defendant with a valuable lead or necessary link
in his chain of proof. For these reasons an "at trial" limitation has an
extremely restrictive effect on discovery and is eliminated from the Rule.
co-defendant; (3) defendant's prior record; (4) documents and tangible objects;
(5) reports of examinations and tests. Discovery of witness lists is provided for, but
left to the discretion of the court. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, supra note 57, at 35-37.
199. The most important category being discovery of witness lists and statements
which is the area of greatest deficiency in present discovery rules.
200. See pp. 664-65 supra.
201. See State v. Mahoney, 122 Vt. 456, 461, 176 A.2d 747, 750 (1961), and note

183 supra.
202. See pp. 665-66 supra.
203. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 55. See pp. 665-66 supra.
204. Id.

205. Id.
206. This evidence might be discoverable under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963). See notes 23 and 24 supra.
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The most significant addition to evidence discoverable under revised
Rule 16(a) is the category of witness lists and witness' statements. 20 7 In
most respects this evidence is the most important to the preparation of the
defendant's case, and it is this evidence which is expressly excluded from
pretrial disclosure under Rule 16(b). The Jencks Act 20 8 is totally inadequate as a discovery device for the defendant. Disclosure occurs under it
only after the trial has begun and it is extremely difficult for the defense attorney to fully utilize the information at this late stage in the proceedings. 20 9
The proposed Rule requires that the prosecutor supply defense counsel
with a "brief but revealing transcription" of witnesses' statements which
are within the possession of the government. This transcription may be a
verbatim statement or a compilation of notes taken by the police or prosecutor during an interview with the witness. The purpose the statement is
to serve is merely to inform the defendant of the existence of the witness
and the extent of the witness' knowledge of the case. This is necessary
for defense counsel to effectively utilize the deposition procedure of proposed subsection (h) for in depth discovery of the witness, if defense
counsel decides it necessary to do so.
Subsection (a) of the proposed Rule incorporates the requirement of
the Brady decision and extends beyond. The Supreme Court in Brady
never clearly defined what type of evidence the prosecution has a positive
duty to disclose referring only to "favorable" evidence. 210 As noted above,
"favorable" evidence can range anywhere from clearly exculpatory information to very damaging items. A key witness' inability to describe the
perpetrator of the crime may not be considered exculpatory evidence by
the prosecution; however, this information would certainly aid the defendant in preparing his case. Disclosure of this type of "evidence" is required
under the proposed subsection.
The proposed revision of Rule 16(c) reforms the present section (c)
in two major aspects: discovery by the defendant under sections (a) and
(b) may not be conditioned upon his compliance with Rule 16(c) (discovery by the government) ; and the defendant may be required to provide
the Government with a list of prospective witnesses. The first change
207. This proposed revision is directly contra the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1964), and therefore it may not be implemented by the federal courts absent Congressional repeal of this act. See Hill, supra note 3, § 11.02[3] [b] ; Rezneck, supra
note 3, § 10.02[5] [a] ; Greogory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
Usually defense discovery is conditioned on defendant's willingness under Rule 16(c)
to disclose a similar list of witnesses. See, e.g., Rezneck, supra note 3, § 10.02[6], for
discussion of reciprocal discovery under Rule 16(c) and constitutional objections to it.
208. In the federal courts, there appears to be an absolute bar to discovery of
statements made by government witnesses. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
209. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 7, at 56, where it is noted that the right
to advance notice of witnesses against the defendant and their prior statements might
come under the ambit of the sixth amendment and due process. Palermo v. United
States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-66 (1959) (concurring 9pinion).
210. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text supra; JUDICIAL CONERENC,, supra
note 57, at 50-51.
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deals with reciprocity and its contingent constitutional problems.

2n

In

effect the Government is prevented from using Rule 16(c) as a device
which requires the defendant to "pay" for his discovery by waiving his
constitutional rights and it requires the Government to utilize Rule 16(g)
to compel compliance. Discovery by the Government remains discretionary
with the court to further implement the policy that defendant should not
be forced to disclose incriminating evidence in order to be able to discover
items under Rule 16(a) and (b). The second revision in Rule 16(c)
adopts a procedure practiced in certain states2 12 - exchange of witness
lists between the prosecution and defense. An implementation of this
procedure would facilitate a speedy and just disposition of the case. The
procedure raises basic constitutional issues, however, regarding the defendant's right to remain silent. It is submitted that this right against
self-incrimination, in practice, is not absolute. The privilege protects only
testimonial utterances and, as noted above, the Government may utilize
213
It
the accused's body as a valuable source of information against him.
would seem that to require the accused to provide his witness list for
the Government is less abrasive to his constitutional rights than the use
of his body to provide incriminating evidence. In essence, the defendant
is not being asked to provide evidence against himself but to eliminate
surprise from the trial and aid in a complete investigation of the case
which can only result in a just disposition.
Proposed Rule 16 divides evidence into two groups: (1) the evidence
enumerated in 16(a), (b) and (c), and (2) the three categories enumerated
in 16(e). As to the first group of evidence, 16(e) has the effect of delaying the operation of the court's discretion until a party has come forward
and shown cause why discovery should be denied. Read in conjunction
with 16(a) and (b), which mandate discovery of certain items subject to
the operation of subsection (e) protective order, a strong presumption in
favor of discovery arises requiring a substantial showing to defeat disclosure. Therefore, unrestricted operation of the court's discretion at the
initial request is avoided. As to the second category of evidence, those
items enumerated in 16(e), a presumption against discovery arises greatly
lessening the burden of showing cause for denial of discovery by the
party opposing discovery. Given the conservatism the federal courts have
211. See Katz, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases: The Concept of Mutuality
and the Need for Reform, 5 CRIM. L. BULL. 441 (1969).
It has been held in some state courts that a defendant may be required to
make pretrial disclosure of evidence which he intends for use at trial without violating
the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. In Jones v. Superior Court of
Nevada County, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919 (1962), the court
indicated that mandatory pretrial disclosure applied only to items which defendant
intends for use at trial eliminates the elements of incrimination and involuntariness of
the privilege against self-incrimination. A recent proposal for resolving this dilemma

would grant an independent right of discovery to the Government and the defendant.
See JUDICIAL CONFXrONCe, supra note 57, at 39, 57.
212. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 1.220(e) (1968) ; N.J.R. § 3:13-3(c) (1) & (d) (2)
(1969) ; Hill, supra note 3, at § 11.02[3] [b].
213. See p. 671 supra.
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exhibited in interpreting present Rule 16, it would seem that in practice,
proposed Rule 16(e) would provide adequate protection against abuse
by the defense.
By far the most significant proposed revision in Rule 16 is proposed
214
As noted above,'21 it
section (h) - a criminal deposition proceeding.
has been suggested by commentators that an expansion of our preliminary
examination as an effective discovery device modeled on its British counterpart could provide a vehicle for implementing the criminal discovery
process. 216 But such an expansion appears impractical and is not respon217
sive to the total needs of the criminal justice system.
However, the British experience in this area is valuable in that it is
indicative of the fact that broad criminal discovery and effective law enforcement are not mutually exclusive. 218 Witness discovery is a key
element in effective criminal discovery and the experience in certain of
our states has indicated that a system which incorporates this practice is
not unworkable. Therefore, what is needed to effectively reform pretrial
criminal discovery is a convenient, extra-judicial means of witness confrontation. The deposition procedure is familiar to attorneys, and its
successful application in civil proceedings at least warrants a close examination of its use as a criminal discovery device. 219 The deposition is less
cumbersome than a full-fleged hearing, can be administered without the
direct supervision of the court, and provides the defendant with the opportunity to confront government witnesses at the pretrial stage with all the
advantages that such confrontations can provide.
Proposed Rule 16(h) makes the granting of a deposition order within
the discretion of the court, although the defendant need not show any more
than that the deponent's testimony may aid him in the preparation of his
case. The broad discovery afforded the defendant under proposed Rule
16(a) and (b) will permit the defense attorney to make a cogent argument
for allowing a deposition if required to do so. It should also be noted that
16(h) is subject to the proposed protective order which operates as a safe220
guard against any abuse which might occur.
214. This is not a new suggestion. See Goldstein, supra note 90, at 1193; Weinberg & Weinberg, supra note 159, at 1400-02.
215. See pp. 674-75 supra.
216. It has been urged that:
it is time that testimonial discovery in criminal cases was extended on a more
rational basis. Liberalization of the rules governing the availability of grand jury
minutes, Jencks Act statements, and other written material will not provide an
effective substitute for preliminary hearing discovery. All of them lack the
advantage of direct confrontation and of having witnesses under oath and subject
to cross examination. In our view, only the adoption of deposition procedures....
would afford adequate and consistent discovery in criminal cases.
Weinberg & Weinberg, supra note 159, at 1400-01 (footnotes omitted).
217. See pp. 677-78 supra.
218. See Brennan, supra note 5, at 293.
219. See Weinberg & Weinberg, supra note 159, at 1401.
220. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b), with FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(e). See generally
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Proposed Amendments to Civil Rules, 43 F.R.D. 211, 224-36. (1967),
which illustrates the relationship between the scope of discovery and the protective
order in civil procedure.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

This Comment has dealt with only one phase of the criminal justice
system and the myriad of obstacles raised in the discussion of the policy
considerations on either side of the issue is testimony to the difficult task
that lies ahead in the administration of criminal justice. The dilemma of
criminal discovery is real and viable solutions to its many complex problems
are not easily drafted. One thing is clear - the system can no longer pay
lip service to the principle that criminal justice must be a search for truth.
It should also be apparent that while criminal and civil actions share
the same adversary setting, there are problems unique to the criminal
case 221 which prevent wholesale adoption of the federal civil discovery
rules as a solution to the issue of reforming criminal discovery. Whatever
discovery scheme is adopted must be sensitive to these unique problems
and deal with them directly. Perhaps the initial step is a refocusing of the
goal of the criminal justice system from a conviction oriented adversary
proceeding to a justice oriented proceeding based on cooperation and trust
to solve a problem common to all of society.
Alan M. Lieberman

221. The most notable ones are the defendant's right against self-incrimination;
the necessity of safeguarding the welfare of prospective state's witnesses; and, the
fact that in criminal litigation the parties are rarely evenly matched.
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